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11 Introduction
Since 1991 the Czech Republic is in the process of reforming the domestic economy
into a market economy.1 The reform strategy is characterized by a ”big bang”pro-
gram, consisting e.g. of a full liberalization of consumer and producer prices, a
considerable decrease in government subsidies, a liberalization of trade, a drastic
depreciation of the koruna, and a rapid privatization program for enterprises (see
Aghevli et al, 1992). In 1992 the privatization of small enterprises has been com-
pleted, whereas the liberalization of large enterprises, which took place in two steps,
has come to an end in the beginning of 1995. Nowadays more than 80 percent of the
assets are privately owned.
In addition to the rapid reform program the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CMEA) has been dismantled. It may not come as a surprise that initially
the reform program, in combination with the dismantling of the CMEA, has brought
about a strong decline in domestic output. However, after some time, it seems as if the
reform program starts to become successful. As compared to many other transition
economies, the Czech Republic faces favorable macroeconomic developments in the
sense that inﬂation has go down dramatically, the unemployment rate is relatively
low, and the external position seems to be healthy.
One of the most important ingredients for a continuing successful economic de-
velopment is the behavior of private enterprises. Due to the dismantling of the CMEA
and the launching of the far reaching reform measures, the economic environment of
enterprises in the Czech Republic drastically changed. Moreover, the privatization
programs changed the corporate control of enterprises. One of the consequences of
the rapid privatizations is that the average size of enterprises became much smaller.
During the period of central planning, enterprises with less than 100 employees were
rare, and about one third of the enterprises had more than 1000 employees. In 1994
not more than 6 percent of the enterprises had more than 1000 employees (Banerjee
et al, 1995). The reform program also had an important effect on the proﬁtability of
the enterprises: the proﬁt rate for the enterprise sector as a whole declined from 8
percent in 1992 to 4 percent in 1993 (Banerjee et al, 1995, p. 9).
The begin period of structural reforms is characterized by a decline in investment
activity. However, an ongoing process of economic growth requires an increase in
private investment. In order to be able to stimulate private investment, more insights
into investment behavior of Czech private ﬁrms is indispensable. Unfortunately, data
1This research was undertaken with support from the European Union’s PHARE ACE Programme
1996.
2availability made it until recently impossible to perform a ﬁrm level investment study
for the Czech Republic. Recently some investment studies using ﬁrm level data for
the Czech Republic came to the fore. L´ izal (1996) uses the CSO data for 1992
and 1993. He focuses on two aspects of investment behavior. First, it might be so
that ﬁrms are investing less than the optimum of minimum adjustment costs. The
economic reason is that ﬁrms are in the process of labour managed ﬁrms (LMF)
into market-oriented ﬁrm. L´ izal mentions capital market imperfections as a second
argument for underinvestment. A second element in this study is the idea that the
Czech republic is a small open transition economy, where ﬁrms might be multi-
focused on both export and domestic markets. There is no evidence in the panel data
however. Lizal and Svejnar (1997) ﬁnd that there is no evidence for the hypothesis
that privately owned ﬁrms perform better than state owned ﬁrms (contrary to earlier
ﬁndings. Anderson and Kegels (1997) estimate accelerator models using annual data
for 1993 and 1994. Their focus is on the legal status of the ﬁrm. State-owned ﬁrms
that were privatized during 1994 were found to be less ﬁnancially constrained than
early privatized (de novo) ﬁrms. This conclusion is in line with a pattern that state-
owned enterprises were placed under ﬁnancial discipline relatively early in transition.
While the studies mentioned above do give important information about invest-
ment behavior of private enterprises, it is remarkable that none of these studies for-
mally assess how private investment in the Czech Republic is affected by the increase
in uncertainty in recent years. Some studies discuss the effects of the introduction of
the reform programs on private investment. In these studies it is mostly taken for
granted that the introduction of the reform programs initially made the economic
environment for ﬁrms more uncertain, and hence has led to a decrease in private
investment. Implicitly these studies e.g. assume that ﬁrms are risk averse. However,
the process of reforming the Czech Republic has also developed some proﬁt making
opportunities for risk taking ﬁrms. For instance, during the program of rapid privati-
zation, bankruptcy laws protected enterprises from bankruptcy proceedings until the
transfer of property to new owners has been completed. This not only prevent ﬁrms
from bankruptcy, itmay also induce tremendous risk taking by the old owners, hoping
to make big proﬁts before selling the enterprise. Moreover, the government of the
Czech Republic implicitly insured many enterprises from going bankrupt. Especially
for those enterprises which closing down would lead to big social costs, such as
a rise in unemployment, the government rescued enterprises from bankruptcy. The
measures taken include credit guarantees bythe National Property Fund, participation
in debt-equity swaps and restructuring arrangements with the major creditors (Baner-
jee, 1995, p. 29). Also banks may implicitly have stimulated risk loving behavior
3of ﬁrms. Many banks suffer from insufﬁcient loan-loss provisions for the bad loans
in their portfolios, which made them very reluctant to start bankruptcy proceedings.
This induces limited liabilities for ﬁrms, which may induce ﬁrms to take more risk
It is interesting to know how private investment behavior is affected by changes in
uncertainty.
Another issue which is not taken into account in the existing studies on private
investment in the Czech Republic is the effect of capital market imperfections (except
for the Anderson-Kegels study). Before the reform program started, loans to enter-
prises were entirely determined by government policies. The government decided
how the available amount of credit was distributed over the enterprises. Nowadays,
the situation has been changed drastically. The reform of the banking sector is an
important element of the adjustment program in the Czech Republic. This has an
important effect on the distribution of credit over different enterprises. Moreover, it
appears that private banks, due to the concentration of bank deposits in short-term
maturities, are very reluctant to provide long-term credit in order to avoid a strong
mismatch between the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. As a result, the
share of long-term credit declined from about 50 percent in the beginning of 1991
to about 30 percent from 1993 onwards (Banerjee, 1995, p. 31). This of course may
have an important effect on private investment. More in general, it is expected that
in the Czech Republic where bad loans and lack of credit-worthiness of ﬁrms is still
one of the main problems in the ﬁnancial system, capital market imperfections may
have an important impact on investment behavior.
In this study we examine private investment behavior of enterprises in the Czech
Republic. A special feature of the study is that the investment equations include vari-
ables which maygive somemoreinsights into therole ofcapital market imperfections
as well as the effect of uncertainty. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a survey of the recent literature on investment. Section 3 describes the data
set we use for the estimates. The regression results are described in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 Investment theories
In the last decade, due to the limited success of existing econometric models in ex-
plaining corporate investment, considerable intellectual attention has been given to
improving the theory of investment. As is very often the case in economics, different
routes are followed in the attempt to come up with theoretically more convincing
explanations of corporate investment behavior. One branch of the profession em-
4phasizes the importance of costly reversibility and uncertainty, while capital market
imperfections are the core of analyses of another group of economists.2 This section
pays attention to both types of investment studies.
A company can ﬁnance its investments by issuing either equity or debt. However,
the return characteristics of both types of ﬁnance are totally different. Equity repre-
sents ownership in a company, and therefore receives an uncertain share of the future
proﬁt stream of the company. Debt represents aﬁxed payment to the lender. Anequity
contract has limited liability, implying that shareholders do not have to pay the ﬁrms
debt if the earnings of the ﬁrm are insufﬁcient to cover the payments of the debt, i.e. if
the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. Hence, the dividend stream is constrained to be non-negative.
Due to the different return characteristics of both types of ﬁnance one would expect
that there is an optimal level of the leverage ratio (debt to equity ratio), which would
lead to a maximization of the value of the ﬁrm. However, surprisingly, this does not
have to be the case in a neoclassical world, as is shown by Modigliani and Miller
(1958). They show that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy is irrelevant. More precisely, they
prove that the market value of a ﬁrm depends only on its proﬁt stream and is invariant
to whether the ﬁrm ﬁnances itself through bonds or equities, i.e. it’s capital structure.
The basic argument underlying their statement is that arbitrage precludes the market
value of a ﬁrm to be altered by a change in ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy when the proﬁt
stream is given. In the case where investors have the same ﬁnancial opportunities
than ﬁrms, investors can always undo whatever ﬁrms do on the ﬁnancial markets.
The MM invariance proposition has been of great importance for the literature
on corporate investment. Using the MM theory as a theoretical underpinning, the
neo-classical investment theory, mostly associated with scholars like Jorgenson (see
Jorgenson, 1963 and 1971), argues that ﬁnancial variables, like cash ﬂow, proﬁts etc,
should not be included in investment equations. According to this theory, ﬁrms derive
investment decisions by maximizing its market value or equivalently optimizing prof-
its, in a tax-free certain world with perfect capital markets. In this setting, the ﬁrm’s
desired capital stock, and hence also investment, only depends on factor prices and
technology, without any role for ﬁnancial variables. The reason is simple: if ﬁnancial
policy does not affect the market value, it also implies that if ﬁrms want to maximize
its market value ﬁnancial variables do not matter and hence only real decisions are
important. The real activity of the ﬁrm then is independent of its ﬁnancing choice.
2that there are virtually no studies available in which it is tried to combine the abovementioned two
new strands of research on investments. The only available empirical studies refer to Western European
countries. Scaramozzino (1997) combines irreversibility with capital market imperfections in a model
for the U.K., and Peeters (1996) for Belgium and Spain.
5For the development of corporate ﬁnance and investment theory the MM proposi-
tions in it self may not be that important. A clear understanding of the underlying as-
sumptions of the propositions, and related to that the signiﬁcance of the ”limitations,”
is of greater importance, since it shows when ﬁnance does matter, and hence under
which conditions ﬁnancial factors become relevant in investment equations. One very
important assumption underlying the MM result concerns perfect information.
2.1 Capital market imperfections
One of the most important assumptions underlying the MM propositions is that in-
dividuals are not capital constrained and have the same ﬁnancial opportunities than
ﬁrmsso that homemade leverage ispossible. Inpractice this willoften not be the case.
The MM propositions assume that all market participants have full and equal infor-
mation concerning the stream of returns (complete information markets). However, in
real life market participants are often subject to asymmetric information. Asymmetric
information refers to a situation in which one agent has superior information on the
characteristics ofagood or investment project that another agent does not have. While
the problem of asymmetric information can arise in allkind of markets, itisespecially
important for credit relationships. For instance, a manager of a ﬁrm very often has
more information about the characteristics ofaproject than abank. This willprobably
lead to capital constraints
Asymmetric information can lead to two problems. The ﬁrst one is adverse se-
lection. This refers to a situation where one agent has prior information about the
quality of a good, whereas another agent at most knows the probability distribution
function. In a seminal paper, Akerlof, (1970) , by analyzing the working of a car
market, provided the ﬁrst rigorous analysis of the problem of adverse selection.H e
shows that in the case where sellers have more knowledge of the quality of the good
or service sold than the buyer, a price adjustment for all the goods may occur. Even-
tually a situation with no trade may result. This is the so-called lemon principle (see
Akerlof, 1970). In the case where the buyer is unable to distinguish good and bad
products, the price of the goods will drop, as bad goods will drive out the good ones.
In credit markets, adverse selection refers to a situation where a rise in the interest
rate may lead to a less favorable composition of the group of loan applicants. This
may happen because borrowers prepared to pay higher interest rates are usually risk
lovers, so that they undertake projects that are characterized by higher proﬁts if they
succeed, combined with a high probability of failure. On the other hand, borrowers
with the highest probability of success may decide not to undertake their project after
6an increase in the lending rate. Hence, more risk averse borrowers may drop out of
pool of loan applicants when a lenders increases the interest rate.
The second problem related to asymmetric information is moral hazard.I nt h e
literature it is also known as adverse incentive or as the principal-agent problem.
Moral hazard refers to a situation where two parties agree on a contract, but that one
party afterwards takes an action that is not observed by the other agent. The hidden
actions are meant to increase the welfare of the informed agent at the expense of the
uninformed agent.
Information asymmetries between buyers and sellers may lead to so-called equi-
librium rationing. Unlike disequilibrium rationing, equilibrium rationing assumes
that the price mechanism works. Rationing occurs after full adjustment of the price,
whereas in disequilibrium rationing there is slow or no adjustment of the price. Espe-
cially in credit markets asymmetric information and hence also equilibrium rationing
is an important issue.
In many papers, it is shown that asymmetric information with debt ﬁnance may
lead to sub-optimal investment. The reason is that if lenders are not able to distinguish
between projects, all ﬁrms have to pay the same lending rate in equilibrium. This im-
plies that ﬁrmswithgood projects subsidize ﬁrmswithbadprojects. Ifcapital markets
were perfect, the better ﬁrms would be able to raise bank loans against lower costs. In
other words, asymmetric information may cause costs of internal and external funds
to diverge.
The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model provides an explanation of credit rationing
in the loan market based on information asymmetries. There are also models which
explicitly deal with the equity market. The basic reference here is the Myers and
Majluf (1984) model. (seealso Greenwald etal., 1984). Thesemodels givetheoretical
underpinning of the pecking-order theory: investment is ﬁrst ﬁnanced by internal
liquidity, next by debt and ﬁnally by equity. One of the most important implications
is that investment is mainly ﬁnanced by internal wealth and not by external wealth if
capital market imperfections exist.
In many recent empirical investment studies the importance of internal funds as
an explanatory variable of annual investment outlays is examined (see e.g. Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988, and Hubbard, 1997). In these studies, internal wealth
is often proxied by cash, liquidity, or retained earnings. Mostly, ﬁrms are divided
into groups for which it may be expected that differences exist with respect to the
severity of information problems. Next, the impact of internal funds on investment of
these different groups of ﬁrms is compared in order to see whether there is evidence
for the hypothesis that measures of internal funds are less important determinants of
7investment of those ﬁrms for which banks hold more information. If imperfections in
capital markets exist, then it is expected that differences occur in ﬁnancial constraints
for different classes of ﬁrms; ﬁrms for which the information problem is more severe
have less access to external ﬁnance, revealing itself in a higher level of the coefﬁcient
of the internal funds variable in the investment function of these ﬁrms. A problem
with respect to the examination of the relationship between investment and measures
of internal wealth is that the variable for internal sources may also proxy for the
proﬁtability of investment. One should expect apositive relationship between internal
sources and investment, since ﬁrms with more liquidity are doing well and thus have
better possibilities toinvest. Therefore, in estimating the relation manystudies control
for the effects of proﬁtability by including Tobin’s Q in the equations. However,
this procedure is somewhat problematic due to the fact that current proﬁts might
be a better approximation of future proﬁts than Q is. Moreover, there exist a lot of
problems in measuring Q.
An alternative way to model internal wealth sensitivity is to model explicit exter-
nal wealth constraints. This approach is taken in the so-called Euler equation models
(see Whited, 1992). Euler equations do not need an explicit measurement of Q since
they do not estimate actual investment behavior. Euler models compare unrestricted
intertemporal investment behavior with restricted intertemporal conditions. However,
this method needs a substantial amount of observations to make it useful.
2.2 Investment and uncertainty
The literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty is quite voluminous by
now (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). It has recently gained importance, not the least
because it gives a convincing explanation of the reasons why private investments
in reforming and liberalizing economies, both in Eastern Europe as in the more
”traditional” developing areas, may be negatively affected by the programs which
were primarily intended to increase private investments. Traditionally, investment is
modelled as a decision to be taken now or never. However, the theory of irreversible
investment under uncertainty emphasizes that it might be proﬁtable to postpone the
investment decision in order to wait for more information on the state of the world
relevant to the project. The theory makes the analogy of a real investment decision
with a ﬁnancial call option. A call option gives an investor the right, for a certain
period, to buy an asset against a pre-determined price (the ”exercise” price). Once the
asset is bought, the option is ”irreversible”, implying that the moment at which the
option is exercised becomes extremely important. Since future events are uncertain,
uncertainty considerations play an very important role in explaining the moment of
8”killing” the option. The equivalence with a real investment decision may be clear.
An investor, having the opportunity to invest and being uncertain about future de-
velopments of key variables affecting the proﬁtability of a project, may decide to
wait for more relevant information and hence may decide to delay her investment
decision. This implies that the standard net present value rule for investment, stating
that investment should go on until the value of capital equals the purchase costs, has
to be amended by taking into account that once the investment has been made, the
option to invest does not longer exist. Somewhat loosely stated: investors need to
be compensated for the loss in value related to the disappearance of the investment
option when the investment has been done. Hence, the net present value of investment
minus the purchasing and installation costs needs to be above a certain threshold level
in order to stimulate real investments.
This line of theory predicts a decline in corporate investment if uncertainty in-
creases. It is strongly based on the irreversibility assumption of ﬁxed investment.
If ﬁxed investment is completely reversible, the moment at which the investment
is done becomes less relevant, so that uncertainty may not necessarily lead to an
increase in the investment hurdle. Although the empirical literature seems to suggest
that uncertainty is likely to have a negative impact on investment (for a review, see
Leahy and Whited, 1996), there is a line of literature, following Abel (1983), empha-
sizing the possible positive effects of greater uncertainty on long run investment. This
can be explained as follows. If the marginal revenue product of capital is a convex
function of some random variable (say the output price), Jensen’s inequality shows
that increased uncertainty about the future price of output increases the marginal
revenue product of capital and through that investment.
It is outside the scope of this paper to give a detailed overview of the discussion
on the relationship between investment and uncertainty. We restrict the discussion by
resuming the arguments for convex returns.
1. Risk neutrality. This is the case studied by Hartman (1972).
2. The option to abandon a project. Roberts and Weitzman (1981) show that if a
ﬁrm has the option to abandon a project, an increase in uncertainty increases
the incentive to invest.
3. Costly entry and exit and time to build (see Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996)).
4. Bankruptcy limit downside risk, so uncertain investment projects might be
more attractive from an information economics point of view. In this case, ﬁrms
have limited liabilities. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) .
95. Flexibility of labor relative to capital. If labor can adjust to price shocks ﬂuc-
tuations lead the ﬁrm to change the labor-capital ratio, so the marginal product
of capital changes more than the price change. See Abel (1983).
Finally, we can list arguments for a concave marginal revenue product of capital.
1. Irreversibility combined with some link between current and future investment.
The latter link might originate from decreasing returns to scale, downward
sloping demand or a limit on ﬁrm investment. In case of linearly homogeneous
technology and perfectly elastic demand irreversibilities play no role (see Abel,
1983). Irreversibilities make returns to investment asymmetric.3
2. CAPM predicts greater uncertainty to make investment less desirable. Un-
certainty creates downside risk without creating corresponding upside gains.
Large ’s should indicate undesirable uncertainty.
3. Term structure theories implied to show risk premia. See Ferderer (1993).
The upshot of this analysis is that uncertainty may have an important impact on
the investment decision, but it is unclear at forehand whether uncertainty positively
or negatively affects investment.
3 Data
3.1 The Czech economy
The starting point of the transition of the Czech Republic is the elvet Revolution of
1989. Unlike other Visegrad-economies the Czech economy was a real Soviet-type
economy until 1990, the year of the ﬁrst free elections. In countries like Poland and
especially Hungary more elements of a market economy were present before 1990.
The political division into the Czech Republic and Slovakia is the following landmark
in the recent Czech economic history. Czechoslovakia showed negative GDP growth
rates in 1990-1992 (up to -15 per cent in 1991). After that the Czech Republic shows
GDP growth rates of -0.9 in 1993, 2.6 in 1994, 4.8 in 1995, 5.1 in 1996 and 2.2
in 1997. Inﬂation ﬂuctuates around 10 per cent. The Czech economy is seen as the
former centrally planned economy withthe highest potential. Itsgeographic situation,
3Interest rates might be an exception, since present values are a convex function of interest rates, so
the sigh might be ambiguous, see Ingersoll and Ross.
10close to Germany, and its sectoral economic development are responsible for this
suspicion.
A program of fundamental changes to a market economy is implemented from
January 1991 onwards. The privitization started with cash sale of 20 thousand retail
stores, restaurants and service facilities. This round was ﬁnished in 1993. Some 4400
larger manufacturing ﬁrms were sold by coupon sales to Czech citizens at 1/30th of
the book value of assets in two waves. The ﬁrst wave was completed at the end of
1992. The ﬁrms privatized in this round were considered to be simpler to privatize.
The second wave started in October 1992 and the ﬁnal bidding round was at the end
of 1994. In this round ﬁrms with a high debt burden were present. The Czech ap-
proach to the problem of debt overhang concentrated on recapitalization of the banks
rather than debt relief. The National Property Fund (NPF) replaced non-performing
loans from the assets of large state-owned banks by bonds issued by the NPF. The
bad loans were transferred to the books of the Consolidation Bank (KOB) against
corresponding deposits of the Czech National Bank. The privitization led to a market
capitalization of 30 per cent of GDP.
The state kept large minority stakes in ﬁrms of strategic interest like banks. Most
investors operate through mutual funds, which are owned by banks or insurance
companies. A majority of stock ownership now runs through these mutual funds.
3.2 Panel data
All Czech ﬁrms are obliged to report to the Czech National Ofﬁce of Statistics (CSO)
their balance sheet and income statements. Incomplete or false declarations are sub-
ject to penalties. Lizal (1996) doubts whether ﬁrms really take care of ﬁlling in the
right numbers. In his sample a substantial percentage fails consistency checks. The
CSO only cares about accounting consistency. Lizal (1996) therefore ﬁlters the data
for negative labor, average wage, production or sales, exports being higher than total
sales and investment exceeding the capital stock.
The data we use in the estimates comes from AMADEUS, a Pan-European ﬁnan-
cial database, containing information on more than 200,000 nonﬁnancial ﬁrms across
Europe4. Local bureaus provide the data. AMADEUSonly includes a company when
it satisﬁes one of the following size criteria:
1) a turnover greater than 10 Million Euro;
2) a number of employees greater than 150;
3) a total asset sum greater than 10 million Euro.
4Note that only about 5000 companies are listed in Europe.
11Uniformity is achieved by standardization of accounting information. Unfortu-
nately, for the Czech Republic, as well as most other Eastern European countries,
AMADEUS only contains information for a small sample period, mostly 1993-1996.
In order to get some stability in the sample, we do not include ﬁrms with less than
three years of observations. Due to the limited time period for which data is avail-
able on a ﬁrm level, we apply a cross-section analysis on the averages of the data.
The advantage is that by using averages, data problems are probably less. More-
over, estimating a dynamic investment model using two or three observations can
be misleading since adjustment process cannot be identiﬁed. We average all original
variables prior to any other transformation. All data are denominated in millions of
current US dollars. Since US inﬂation has been moderate in the sample period, this
transformation helps to avoid inﬂation problems.
The following variables are retrieved from AMADEUS:
K: tangible assets. This variable is used to scale all other variables in order to
account for heteroskedasticity. The ﬁrst difference is deﬁned to be net investment I
DEP: depreciation.
SAL: sales. We use this variable in its ﬁrst difference form, 1SAL, as the accel-
erator variable.
CF: cash ﬂow, deﬁned as before-tax proﬁts plus depreciation.
PROF: ﬁnal proﬁt or loss. It is deﬁned as proﬁts after tax and extraordinary
payments.





CEMP: costs of employees.
Before testing the different regression models, we carefully scrutinized the data
set. Inaddition to skipping some extreme outliers of all variables taken into account in
the regressions, we ignored all ﬁrms with negative gross investment (net investment
plus depreciation), as well as all ﬁrms with a net investment to capital ratio above
0.35. The ﬁnal data set contains 1284 ﬁrms. The estimates are done for three groups
of ﬁrms, based on the size, as measured by the stock of ﬁxed assets. The arguments
to look at ﬁrm size are threefold. First, as noted in our discussion on privitization,
small ﬁrms are privitized in an early stage of the reform. At least this holds for the 20
thousand small ﬁrms. We are not sure that these ﬁrms coincide with our small ﬁrms
12in the sample however. But as Anderson and Kegels show, the early privatized ﬁrms
tend to be the smaller ﬁrms. Secondly, there is the idea that smaller ﬁrms have less
easy access to external capital markets. Finally, small ﬁrms are found to be more risk-
loving than older mature ﬁrms. So, we distinguish between small (S), medium sized
(M) and larger (L) ﬁrms. The three groups are made by simply dividing the entire
group of ﬁrms in three sub-groups with the same amount of ﬁrms per sub-group.
The original group of large ﬁrms appeared to contain some extreme outliers, which
have been ignored in the estimates. Ultimately, the group of small ﬁrms contains 432
enterprises, the group of medium-sized ﬁrms contains 434 enterprises and the group
of large ﬁrms 418 enterprises.
Table 1 gives information on the mean and median of the most important variables
used in the estimates. As a measure of uncertainty we use the coefﬁcient of variation,
.cv/, calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of a variable to the absolute
value of its mean.
13Table 1 Mean and median of variables included
Variable All ﬁrms Small Medium Large
Number 1284 432 434 418
Mean
K 3.829 0.792 2.729 8.143
I
K 0.054 0.023 0.074 0.067
1SAL
K 1.753 1.218 1.796 2.088
CF
K 0.187 0.027 0.305 0.218
cv.PROF/
K 0.249 20.46 0.170 0.322
cv.SAL/
K 0.536 1.288 0.228 0.090
cv.CF/
K 2.264 6.578 0.148 0.074
cv.CEMP/
K 0.215 0.526 0.079 0.040
DEBT
K 1.117 0.858 0.939 1.478
LOAN
K 0.334 0.319 0.314 0.374
LTD
K 0.373 0.483 0.291 0.349
CAP
K 1.112 1.761 0.791 0.792
CRED
K 1.314 0.940 1.061 1.844
Median
K 2.619 0.793 2.640 6.998
I
K 0.041 0.007 0.059 0.053
1SAL
K 0.646 0.461 0.807 0.661
CF
K 0.118 0.038 0.187 0.138
cv.PROF/
K 0.249 2.586 0.161 0.220
cv.SAL/
K 0.191 0.733 0.230 0.071
cv.CF/
K 0.103 2.599 0.073 0.063
cv.CEMP/
K 0.067 0.200 0.068 0.028
DEBT
K 0.389 0.379 0.413 0.366
LOAN
K 0.136 0.165 0.119 0.125
LTD
K 0.155 0.165 0.131 0.175
CAP
K 0.924 1.073 0.850 0.798
CRED
K 0.316 0.321 0.322 0.304
14The table shows that for all variables the mean is much higher than the median.
Hence, the data is characterized by positive skewness. This is a normal phenomenon
in panel data ﬁrm studies. It signals that in estimating the models one should be
cautious about nonnormality of the residuals.
4 Estimation results
Before we turn to estimation we sum up our main hypotheses on Czech ﬁrms.
1. Since equity markets are not established yet and the business cycle is a promi-
nent phenomenon, we expect that an accelerator model will describe unre-
stricted investment plans satisfactorily. We model the accelerator model using
the change in sales (see also Anderson and Kegels, 1997).
2. Capital market imperfections will hit Czech ﬁrms in general. Since smaller
ﬁrms are privatized in an early stage of the reform because they had no serious
ﬁnancial problems these ﬁrms might not be constrained as much as some of the
larger ﬁrms. These ﬁrms, especially, the ones privatized in the last stage were
affected by bad loans.
3. We expect that especially younger Czech ﬁrms are more risk-taking than their
western brothers. This might be due to limited liability in the early stage of
reform.
We estimate a standard accelerator model, extended by some variables which
proxy for capital market constraints and variables which proxy for uncertainty. The
model we estimate is extremely simple and is formulated as follows:
I
K

























K in line with the accelerator model of investment. The next vari-
able in the model is cash ﬂow (CF). This variable is introduced in order to test for
capital market imperfections. The idea is that ﬁrms which have more problems in
communicating their position to ﬁnancial intermediaries should have more problems
inreceiving external funds, and hence aremore dependent oninternal funds. Forthese
ﬁrms, investment is more sensitive to changes in the measure of internal funds than
15for ﬁrms with less information problems. In other words, it is expected that ﬁrms with
more information problems have a relatively high coefﬁcient for CF. In the literature
on western ﬁnancial structures is assumed that larger ﬁrms are less confronted with
capital market imperfections. It is to be expected that monitoring and screening costs
which has to be made before banks decide to lend some amount of money are lower
per unit of capital for large ﬁrms than for small ﬁrms. Opposite to this argument
is the argument based on the subgroups of privitization, as presented above. Next,
we introduce the coefﬁcient of variation as the proxy for uncertainty. The usual
procedure is to calculate on the basis of existing time series, expected time paths of
different variables onaﬁrmlevelbasis. Uncertainty is thenmeasured asthe difference
between the actual outcomes of the variables under consideration and the calculated
expected values. However, there are no long-term time series data on a ﬁrm level
available for the countries under consideration in this study. For most ﬁrms, we only
have information for about four years. so that the standard method can not be used.
Therefore, we simply measure uncertainty by the standard deviation of the variable
which should proxy for uncertainty. We scale the standard deviation by its mean, and
hence usethe coefﬁcient ofvariation, toaccount for size effects. Intheory, uncertainty
can be related to all kind of variables: costs, sales, proﬁts etcetera. Again, we are
constrained by the data available. In the data set there are four candidates which can
be used to proxy for uncertainty: the coefﬁcient of variation of sales, proﬁts, cash ﬂow









variables proxy for sales or cost uncertainty. Due to high multicollinearity between
these four variables we do not add them simultaneously in the model.5 Instead we
estimate the equation four times, using each time one proxy for uncertainty. The
ﬁnal four variables in the equation are included in order to account for effects of the
ﬁnancial structure on private investment. The sign of these variables are ambiguous
at forehand.
Table 2 presents the regression results for the group of small ﬁrms, Table 3 for
medium sized ﬁrms and table 3 for large ﬁrms. A * denotes insigniﬁcant; ** denote
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. All other coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
signiﬁcance levels in all presented estimates are based on White’s heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors.
5all independent variables used in this study can be obtained from the authors on request.
16Table 2: Regression results for small ﬁrms
const 0.024 0.028 0.027 0.025
CF
K 0.060** 0.064 0.072 0.072
1SAL









0.013 0.0001 0.002* 0.0008
DEBT
K -0.037 -0.039 -0.039 -0.041
CAP
K -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
LTD
K 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016
LOAN
K 0.004* 0.004* 0.005* 0.005*
CRED
K 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.022
adj:R2 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
F 60.02 59.45 58.62 59.47
Skewness 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.69
Kurtosis 4.49 4.49 4.44 4.46
Table 3: Regression results for medium-sized ﬁrms
const 0.070 0.089 0.079 0.086
CF
K 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.040
1SAL









0.187 -0.025* 0.030* -0.008*
DEBT
K -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012*
CAP
K -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.026*
LTD
K -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012*
LOAN
K 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
CRED
K 0.007* 0.007* 0.006* 0.007*
adj:R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
F 6.92 6.20 6.31 6.39
Skewness 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52
Kurtosis 3.20 3.15 3.13 3.18
17Table 4: Regression results for large ﬁrms
const 0.053 0.068 0.052 0.055
CF
K 0.055 0.054 0.056 0.053
1SAL









0.204 -0.024** 0.109** 0.122*
DEBT
K -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
CAP
K -0.007* -0.006* -0.008* -0.007*
LTD
K 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 0.002*
LOAN
K -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.006*
CRED
K 0.005* 0.005* 0.006** 0.004*
adj:R2 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
F 6.83 6.31 6.25 6.39
Skewness 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.13
Kurtosis 4.15 4.12 4.16 4.28
Before describing the regression results, a word of warning is needed. It appears
that in none of the regressions the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals
could be accepted. As can be seen in the last two rows in the tables, the skewness in
all regressions is above zero, implying that the distribution of the residuals is skewed
to the right. Moreover, the kurtosis is above three, suggesting heavier tails than a
normal distribution. By considering the summary Jarque-Bera test (not presented) it
appears that the null of normally distributed residuals is rejected in all cases. The
calls for some caution with respect to the interpretation of the estimation results.
In all regressions for small and large ﬁrms 1SAL is highly signiﬁcant and has
the right sign. This strongly conﬁrms the relevance of the accelerator model for the
ﬁrms in our data set. However, for the group of medium-sized ﬁrms this appears not
to be the case. Anderson and Kegels (1997) ﬁnd no support for the sales-accelerator
model. The argue that Czech ﬁrms were undergoing restructuring so that sales might
be ﬂat or declining even though there is a strong potential future growth. The cash
ﬂow variable is signiﬁcant in all regressions. This suggests private ﬁrms in the Czech
Republic doface capital constraints. However,wedonotﬁndevidence for thepopular
”western” believe that small ﬁrms are more constrained than large ﬁrms. While the
coefﬁcient for the medium-sized ﬁrms is smaller than that of the small ﬁrms, this is
not the case for the large ﬁrms.6 A standard critique on the cash ﬂow model is that
6has to be noted that some recent studies suggest that the coefﬁcient of cash ﬂow is not a good proxy
for the existence of capital market constraints (See Kaplan and Zingales, 1997).
18CF may also proxy for the proﬁtability of investment, so that one should be cautious
to interpret the coefﬁcient for CF in relation to capital market imperfections. A usual
way to account for this critique is to add Tobin’s Q to the investment model. This
variable is supposed to control for proﬁtability. However, the data set we are using
thus not allow for calculating a proxy for Tobin’s Q. The only variable, related to the
concept of proﬁtability, we could take into account is the proﬁt margin, which is the
ratio of net proﬁt in total revenue. We are aware of the fact that this might not be a
good candidate for proxiing future proﬁtability. However, given the data set, we do
not have much of a choice. The results of the estimates presented in the tables do
not change when the proﬁt margin is added to the model. For reasons of space, these
outcomes are not presented.
Concerning the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrms we ﬁnd that the results are mixed to
some extent. Weﬁnd aconsistent negative impact of debt. This contradicts the ﬁnding
by Anderson and Kegels, who argue that high debt signals a successful debt program
in the past. We ﬁnd more support for the notion that high leverage is troublesome to
ask for new debt. Short-term loans (not necessarily from banks) is weakly signiﬁcant
to small and medium-sized ﬁrms. In general ﬁnancial structure matters more to the
smaller ﬁrms.
The most interesting outcome concerns the results for the uncertainty measures.
For the group of small ﬁrms, in three out of four cases the coefﬁcient is highly
signiﬁcant, and has a positive sign. For the medium-sized and large ﬁrms a positive
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient is found for the coefﬁcient of variation based on the costs
of employees. The same holds for the coefﬁcient of variation based on sales for
the group of large ﬁrms. In only one case, at a 10% signiﬁcance level (
cv.PROF/
K
for the group of medium-sized ﬁrms) a negative relationship between uncertainty
and private investment is suggested. Overall, the results suggest that if uncertainty
affects investment behavior, the effect is positive. While this outcome is not against
theoretical insights, it certainly contrast with most popular ideas. Enterprises in the
Czech Republic seems to be risk takers. This behavior may well be stimulated by
the weak legal framework for enforcing ﬁnancial discipline, such as the reluctance to
bankruptcy proceedings by commercial banks aswellas thegovernment, as described
in the introduction of this paper.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies private manufacturing ﬁrm investment in the Czech Republic in
the years 1992-1996. It presents cross-section estimation results on an accelerator
19model using asample of 1284 ﬁrms. Anumber of problems hinder estimation. Firstly,
some of the data might be unreliable. We corrected therefore for inconsistencies and
outliers. Secondly, the status of ﬁrms might be changed in the sample period. The
privitization process ran until the beginning of 1995, so at least the beginning of our
sample is hindered by this fact.
Our main interest is in two elements of recent insights in the investment literature.
First we include a proxy for capital market imperfections. We know that, opposite to
the western experience, larger ﬁrms might have a worse reputation on public capital
markets, since these are typically hit by the bad loan problems. Secondly, we are
interested in the effects of uncertainty on investment. It is known that the sign of
the investment-uncertainty relationship is ambiguous. It might be so that risk loving
ﬁrms are positively affected by uncertainty.
Our results ﬁnd support for the accelerator model. We ﬁnd evidence for cash-ﬂow
effects on Czech corporate investment. It still might be so that cash ﬂow proxies for
future investment though. It isstriking that indeed smaller longer privatized ﬁrmsface
relatively less cash ﬂow restrictions. Financial structure doesn’t matter as much as we
expected. Weﬁnd that smaller ﬁrmsreact positively to more uncertainty, although our
proxies for uncertainty seem to be artiﬁcial.
A few warnings are necessary. First, we have to cope with properly taking care of
the distributions of the variables. Secondly, a relation between size and legal status
could be included ore rigorously. Finally, for those ﬁrms listed on the stock exchange
it is interesting to use more market information on future proﬁtability.
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